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NOTES
THE APPLICATION OF THE INSTITUTION OF NEGOTIORUM
GESTIO TO THE CONFINEMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL
On her physician's recommendation, plaintiff was confined
in a private mental hospital for more than a year without her
commitment or continuing consent. After obtaining her release
through habeas corpus proceedings, she sued the hospital for
false imprisonment.' The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana directed a verdict for the de-
fendant. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, stating
the jury could have found plaintiff's detention was false im-
prisonment in Louisiana. Geddes v. Daughters of Charity of St.
Vincent De Paul, 348 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1965).
Since the Louisiana Civil Code makes no mention of false
imprisonment, such actions must fall under article 2315; "every
act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him
by whose fault it happened to repair it. ' ' 2 A party seeking relief
under this article must show "damage" occasioned by another's
"fault." Nevertheless, the jurisprudence recognizes false im-
prisonment as unlawful interference with freedom from con-
finement.3
In the instant case the court stated: "Under Louisiana law
there are two essential elements to the tort of false imprison-
ment, namely, (1) there must be a detention or restraint of the
person, and (2) such detention or restraint must be unlawful."'4
By "restraint" the court referred to the general common law rule
that mobility be absolutely limited to a given area. Simple inter-
ference with movement in a given direction is not false imprison-
1. The common law tort of false imprisonment protects the personal interest in
freedom from restraint of movement. It may constitute restraint on the open
street, traveling in an automobile, confinement to an entire city, or being com-
pelled to accompany the actor. PROSSER, TORTS § 12 (3d ed. 1964). See, e.g.,
Crossett v. Campbell, 122 La. 659, 48 So. 141 (1909).
2. L.A. CivrL CODE art. 2315 (1870).
3. Crossett v. Campbell, 122 La. 659, 48 So. 141 (1909); Went v. Morgan,
3 La. 311 (1832) ; Buquet v. Watkins, 1 La. 131, 134 (1830) ; Wamack v. Kemp,
6 Mart.(N.S.)477 (La. 1828); Bore v. Bush, 6 Mart.(N.S.) 1 (La. 1827)
Sweeten v. Friedman, 9 La. App. 44, 118 So. 787 (1928).
4. Geddes v. Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent De Paul, 348 F.2d 144, 147
(5th Cir. 1965).
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ment.5 By "unlawful," the court implied confinement either un-
consented toO or not brought about by commitment procedures.7
In discussing the necessity for unlawfulness in the detention
the court failed to mention the well-recognized tort doctrine that
liability will not attach if the actor is privileged. Such a priv-
ilege arises in the confinement of alleged insane persons if the
actor can show the person was a danger to himself or the com-
munity.8 "Danger" has been restrictively interpreted to require
immediate urgency before one may detain another without in-
curring liability.9 The basis for the restriction is the traditional
common law emphasis on individual self-determination. How-
ever, unlike most mental health acts, the common law failed to
impose any duty on one detaining another to take affirmative ac-
tion to insure proper treatment. This omission is probably be-
cause at the time the privilege was established there was little
else one could do for the mentally ill other than lock them up.
Today, however, restrictive application of the privilege discour-
ages cooperation between members of society in aiding those in
need, and fails to recognize adequately the social interest in
providing necessary psychiatric treatment.
Generally, the interests of society in treating the mentally
ill are recognized by the commitment procedures of the Mental
Health Act,10 permitting the state to confine the mentally ill for
treatment if it "is in the best interest of the patient and of the
community"" or if the patient is "in need of observation or
care.' 2 Under these commitment procedures the will of the per-
son confined is not considered. If the legality of the action is
challenged, all the state need show is that it was not negligent
5. Bird v. Jones, 7 Q.B. 742, 115 Eng. Rep. 008 (1845). The plaintiff was
prevented from traveling on a public hi-hway.
6. The court stated that the jury could have found that the consent, if originally
given, had been withdrawn, and such would constitute false imprisonment. The
plaintiff had repeatedly requested her release after finding out the type of insti-
tution to which she was confined. 348 F.2d at 148.
7. The court erroneously stated in a footnote that the procedures in the Mental
Health Act are not applicable to private institutions. 348 F.2d at 147 n.1. Contra,
LA. 1.S. 28:50 (190), added by La. Acts 1054, No. 701, § 2, as amended, La.
Acts 1966, No. 482, § 1.
8. 35 C.J.S. Insane Persons § 16, at 641 (190).
9. The application of the rule is usually limited to situations where the actor
can show that there was immediate danger. Ibid.
10. LA. u.S. 28:50 (Supp. 1966) (covered generally in part III, "Examination,
admission, commitment, and detention of mental patients").
11. LA. R.S. 28:53 (Supp. 1966).
12. LA. R.S. 28:52 (Supp. 1966).
(Vol. XXVII
NOTES
in assuming the person committed was in need of psychiatric
care.13
In the instant case plaintiff did not challenge the right of the
state to confine her. The question was whether one not acting
under authority of the state, such as a doctor or hospital, had
the right to confine for treatment a person believed to be men-
tally ill.14 The court's negative reply was correct under tradi-
tional tort law. The court did not rely on two often-given
reasons for denying such a right to a private person: the com-
mon fear that "sane" persons will be "railroaded" into con-
finement, and a distrust of the infant science of psychiatry. The
first seems greatly exaggerated; railroading seldom, if ever,
happens.'- The second may have merit: but if public good
dictates the establishment of a right in a private person pos-
sible difficulty in proving facts should not prevent its establish-
ment. If the interest of society require that such a right be
given to the state, the same interests would favor granting the
right to private persons under proper safeguards against rash
action.
In addition to furthering social interests in maintaining order,
protecting property, and restoring an individual to a level of
productivity, granting such a right to a doctor or hospital would
encourage voluntary cooperation and mutual assistance between
members of society "unsolicited and legally unobliged action
in favor of others."'1  The goal of encouraging voluntary law-
ful action in aid of others by members of society is recognized
in all civilian jurisdictions by the institution generally known by
its Roman name of negotiorum gestio. In Louisiana, the institu-
tion is recognized in Civil Code articles 2295-2300, which en-
courage voluntary intervention in the affairs of another by allow-
ing the manager to recover all "useful and necessary expenses."'17
Thus in civilian jurisdictions, the "volunteer" is rewarded for
his efforts and is generally looked upon favorably by the courts.
13. LA. R.S. 28:52, 28:98.2 (Supp. 1966).
14. The instant case only involved the liability of a hospital, but if a hospital
could be found liable so could a doctor or any private person.
15. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 65, n. 6 (1962). Dr. Francis
Braceland, M.D., stated that he had not seen a single instance of railroading in
his thirty-year connection with psychiatry; Curran, Hospitalization of the Men-
tally Ill, 31 N.C.L. REV. 274, 293-94 (1953). The danger of commitment based
on such wrongful motives as a desire to obtain -the allegedly insane person's pro-
perty is practically nonexistent.
16. PASCAL, NEGOTIORUM GESTIO (unpublished paper in the possession of
Professor Robert A. Pascal, Louisiana State University School of Law).
17. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2299 (1870).
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This may be contrasted with the general disdain traditionally
found in the common law toward the "officious intermeddler."'18
Anglo-American law contains no corresponding institution to
negotiorum gestio. Only where the intervention is "dutiful"'19
will the intervenor be entitled to compensation, that is, when the
actor has conferred a benefit for which the recipient ought to
pay. Moreover, the common law remedy of unjust enrichment
is not nearly so broad as that of negotorium gestio for in the lat-
ter the actor (gestor) need not show any actual benefit bestowed.
Also, the two concepts are premised on two conflicting goals.
Unjust enrichment, like much of the common law, emphasizes
the individual's right to be free from unwarranted interference,
but does so at the expense of discouraging unsolicited aid freely
given to others. The latter idea is the crux of negotiorum gestio.
There are only two instances where Anglo-American law comes
close to the civilian approach toward the intervenor, the first of
these being in cases of agency by necessity20 where in an emer-
gency an agent is entitled to act beyond his authority to prevent
substantial loss to the principal. But these cases are readily
distinguishable in that there must be some sort of agency at the
inception of the relationship. Thus the same act performed by
a stranger or volunteer is not aided by the rule even though his
act be just as useful or reasonable.2 1 The second instance where
the common law approaches the idea of negotiorum gestio is
under a somewhat strained application of the doctrine of unjust
enrichment: although by definition recovery can be had under
unjust enrichment only if the actor shows an actual benefit
bestowed, 22 under section 116 of the Restatement of Restitution
a person supplying aid in an emergency to alleviate pain is en-
titled to reimbursement for his expenses regardless of whether
the service so rendered lessened the suffering of the person in
need. The rationalization that the simple receiving of the at-
tention resulted in enrichment is unpersuasive. This seems to be
the only case in which the common law functionally applies nego-
tiorum gestio.23
18. Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 HARv. L.
REv. 817 (1061).
19. Lorenzen, The Negotiorum Gestio in Roman and Modern Civil Law, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 190 n.1 (1928).
20. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 47 (1933).
21. Pascal, Unsolicited Action on Behalf of Others in American and English
Law, in STUDI GIURIDICI IN MEMORIA DE F. VASS.ALLI 1237, § 4 (1960).
22. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 155 (1937).
23. Pascal, Unsolicited Action on Behalf of Others in American and English
Law, in STUI GIURIDICI IN MEMORIA DE F. VASSALLI 1241 (1960).
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An act of negotiorum gestio is defined by Planiol as the ac-
complishment of a service by a person in the interest of another
without being charged to do so.2 4 He distinguished the institu-
tion from mandate by stating that it must be undertaken by
neither mandate nor law.2 5 This idea is expressed on a philoso-
phical plane by describing the institution as one in which
".. . individuals are recognized as properly possessing the
power to complete the specification of order which has not
been achieved through law or contract. '26
There is little precedent upon which to base an application
of negotiorum gestio to confinement of the mentally ill.27 How-
ever, this of itself is no obstacle so long as the principles upon
which the institution is based are applicable, and application
would be conducive to common good. Moreover, as Planiol points
out, the institution is broad enough to cover not only "juridical
acts, but services or material advantages procured for or ren-
dered to another. '28  Furthermore, article 2295 states: "When
a man undertakes... to manage the affairs of another .... -29
Under the jurisprudence "affairs" has been liberally interpreted
and includes the selling of bonds 3o or the payment for necessary
medical expensesA1 This is in accord with the German view
which "contains no limitation on the types of 'affairs' that can
be managed. '32  Thus, it seems that the institution is designed
to cover any act rendered in the interest of another provided
that the decision to intervene can be said to have been made
reasonably in the interest of another and that the action taken
after the intervention was itself proper. Whether the interven-
tion can be called reasonable represents the most important con-
dition precedent to the application of the doctrine as well as a
significant check against unwarranted interference in the affairs
of another. A variety of terms are used to convey this idea:
24. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE Lou-
ISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2274 (1959).
25. Ibid.
26. PASCAL, NEoOTIORUM GESTIO (unpublished paper in the possession of
Professor Robert A. Pascal, Louisiana State University School of Law).
27. But see Thompson v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 2 La. App. 200 (2d
Cir. 1925), where an employer was held to be a negotiorum. gestor- where he paid
the hospital expenses of an employee in order to save his life.
28. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOU-
ISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2274 (1959).
29. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2295 (1870).
30. Weber v. Graugnard, 173 La. 653, 13S So. 433 (1931).
31. Thompson v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 2 La. App. 200 (2d Cir.
1925).
32. Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruist Intermeddler, 74 HARv. L. REV.
825 (1961).
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justified, usefully conceived, useful, appropriate, or having util-
ity. Reasonableness is a question of judicial interpretation in
each case, but this is a device frequently employed in order to
make the law a flexible tool. The term fault or negligence en-
countered in tort law presents much the same process of judicial
interpretation. 33
The court must test the utility of the act from the time at
which the act took place. The gestor is not forced to assume the
risk that his action, appearing reasonable at the time, will later
turn out to be unprofitable or detrimental to the master's in-
terest.3 4 This is keeping with the general purpose of the institu-
tion: to encourage worthwhile unsolicited aid.
Other conditions precedent to the application of the institu-
tion are: the affair must be lawful; 35 it be done voluntarily ;30
it be done with the expectation of reimbursement of expenses ;7
and it not be done contrary to the express wishes of the master.3 8
The latter condition is simply an application of the require-
ment of reasonableness, for it is difficult to classify an interven-
tion against the will of the master as appropriate or reasonable.
This condition is supported by Louisiana jurisprudence39 and
would bar application of the institution in the instant case were
it not subject to certain exceptions.
In Germany the will of the master is ignored when there is
a duty of the principal the fulfillment of which is in the public
interest, or when there is a statutory duty to furnish maintain-
ance to others. 40 The German statutory exceptions, although ob-
viously inapplicable in Louisiana, do illustrate the applicable
principl that the public interest in encouraging voluntary aid
will, under certain conditions, prevail over the express prohibi-
33. PASCAL, NEGOTIORUM GESTIO (unpublished paper in the possession of
Professor Robert A. Pascal, Louisiana State University School of Law).
34. Lorenzen, The Negotiorum Gestio in Roman and Modern Civil Law, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 196 (1928).
35. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2293 (1870).
36. Id. art. 2295; Lorenzen, The Negotiorum Gestio in Roman and Modern
Civil Law, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 191 (1928).
37. Castro, Negotiorum Gestio in Loui8iana, 7 TUL. L. REV. 253, 254 (1933);
Lorenzen, The Negotiorum Gestio in Roman and Modern Civil Law, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 191, 193 (1928).
38. Amos & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCii LAW 193 (2d ed. 1903)
Nicholas, Unjustified Enrichmcnt in the Civil Law and Louisiana Law, 36 TUL. L.
REV. 618 (1962).
39. Mulligan v. Kenny, 34 La. Ann. 50 (1882); Woodlief & Legendre v.
Moncure, 17 La. Ann. 241 (1865).
40. B.G.B. art. 679.
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tion of the individual. The Italian Civil Code is much to the
same effect, although broader, stating: "except if the prohibition
be against the legislation, public order, or good custom."'' I More-
over, a somewhat analogous situation exists when the express
will of the individual is ignored to render medical treatment
needed to save his life.42
It may not be necessary, however, to apply broad principles
to employ the institution in the instant case, for an "incapable"
is bound to reimburse the gestor for expenses incurred in the
useful management of his affairs. 43 The basis for the rule is
codified in article 2300 which states:
"All persons, such even as are incapable of consent may by
the quasi contract, resulting from the act of a third person,
become either the object or the subject of an obligation; be-
cause the use of reason, although necessary on the part of
the person whose act forms the quasi contract, is not requisite
in those by whom, or in whose favor, the obligation result-
ing from the act, are contracted. '44
"[H] is obligation arises without any voluntary act on his part;
it is independent of his capacity.I 4 5 Thus, an express ratification
by the "incapable" would not convert the act to one of mandate
because of the incapable's incapacity to obligate himself. It
would seem, therefore, that if his consent is ignored due to his
lack of capacity, his prohibition should likewise be ignored. This
idea is shown by the spirit of the rule which places the duty on
the gestor to continue his management until the master is able
to do it himself.40
Therefore, a gestor should not be refused the right to act
contrary to the master's wishes when due to some mental or
physical infirmity the master is unable to manage his own af-
fairs. If in the instant case the woman receiving the psychiatric
treatment was a narcotics addict whose addiction was caused by
psychological or emotional illness, she should be deemed inca-
pable of managing her own affairs, and the hospital should in-
cur no liability for the confinement if the intervention be useful.
41. CODICE CIVILE art. 2031 (Italy 1942).
42. Application of the P'resident and Directors of Georgetown College, 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
43. 2 PLANIOL, CivII. LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2282 (1959).
44. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2300 (1870).
45. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 2282 (1959).
46. LA. CxvIL CODE art. 2295 (1870).
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If negotiorum gestio were applied in the instant case, the
gestor in order to escape liability would have the further burden
of showing that the affair was well managed. 47 This duty, as
well as the requirement that the intervention be deemed useful,
overcomes the more common objections to granting such a right
to an individual. In addition to the duty of using all the care of
a prudent administrator, 4 the gestor must continue his manage-
ment until the principal is in a position to attend to it himself.
49
Thus, one can see that the institution has sufficient safeguards
preventing one from lightly mixing in the affairs of another,
while at the same time, encouraging voluntary action in aid of
one's fellow man.
If the gestor successfully shows that the management was use-
ful and well conducted the master has the obligation to reimburse
the gestor for all useful and necessary expenses incurred as a
result of the management. Article 2299 states that "equity
obliges the owner, whose business has been well managed. . . to
indemnify the manager... and to reimburse him all useful and
necessary expenses." 50 The original idea that the manager was
entitled only to reimbursement for actual expenses has been
broadened to include the usual fee for professional services. 51
The institution of negotiorum gestio provides a workable and
desirable encouragement of unsolicited and unobliged aid while
protecting the individual from "unwelcome intrusion by over-
solicitous strangers. 52 In the instant case, if the hospital could
prove that the individual was incapable of managing her own
affairs because of a mental or physiological disorder and that the
confinement was appropriate and well-managed, it should incur
no liability but would be entitled to the usual fee for its services.
Such a result would not erode individual freedom since the
gestor would have the duty of showing utility or the appropriate-
ness of the intervention. This would be an effective deterrent
against unreasonable confinement. Even if the intervention
were appropriate, the gestor would still be required to show that
47. Id. art. 2299.
48. Id. art. 2298.
49. Id. art. 2295.
50. Id. art. 2299.
51. Lorenzen, The Negotiorum Gestio in Roman and Modern Civil Law, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 204 (1928). CIVIL CODE OF CHILE art. 2290 provides for compensa-
tion whenever one "renders technical or professional services in the ordinary line
of his profession or trade."
52. Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 HAnV. L. REV.
824 (1961).
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it was properly done to escape liability.53 These duties imposed
upon the gestor insure against improper intervention or manage-
ment.
Of course, a hospital should seek to comply as closely as pos-
sible with the Mental Health Act. But, in a case of good faith
lack of compliance, it should incur no liability where all the con-
ditions for the application of the institution of negotiorum gestio
are present.
Robert W. Collings
CIVIL PROCEDURE-SUIT BY WIFE ON COMMUNITY
CAUSE OF ACTION
Gebbia v. City of New Orleans' raises important questions
concerning the applicability of the exceptions of no right of ac-
tion and want of procedural capacity to a suit by a wife to re-
cover a community claim. The case held that a wife is merely
under a procedural incapacity to sue on behalf of the communi-
ty-an incapacity that must be timely challenged by dilatory ex-
ception, or be waived. Reasoning that the wife has a "present,
vested interest" in the community, the court said the peremptory
exception of no right of action cannot prevail against her claim
on behalf of the community.
Legislative and Judicial Background
Before the Married Women's Emancipation Act of 1916,2 a
married woman was unable to sue unless her husband authorized
her to do so, and there was thus no problem of the wife attempt-
ing to independently prosecute claims for the community. Only
after the Emancipation Acts, when a married woman, over eight-
een, could appear in court as party plaintiff without her hus-
band's authorization, did the question of her ability to indepen-
dently assert a so-called community cause of action arise.
53. The master's right to damages do not arise ex delicto since the act of the
gestor is not, under civilian theory, considered unlawful. His intention to aid
another, even if ill conceived, takes his action out of a wrongful category. See
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2293 (1870), where it is stated that obligations arising under
quasi contracts are "lawful and purely voluntary act of man."
1. 249 La. 409, 187 So. 2d 423 (1966), reversing 181 So. 2d. 292 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1965), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1965-1966 Term-Civil Procedure, 27 LA. L.REv. 540, 544 (1967).
2. La. Acts 1916, No. 94, now LA. R.S. 9:102 (1950).
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